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1 Introduction
To protect consumers, public authorities forbid firms to engage in price col-
lusion or other agreements that restrict output1. The formation of research
1See, for example, the Sherman Act in the US and Articles 81-86 of the EC Treaty.
1
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joint ventures or other cooperative R&D agreements is not forbidden, how-
ever, but encouraged by governments because of possible welfare-enhancing
effects2. A theoretical underpinning for the encouragement of R&D coop-
eration is provided in the models of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
and Kamien et al. (1992) (see also Suzumura 1992, Brod and Shivakumar
1997, Petit and Tolwinski 1999, Hinloopen 2003). These models find that
R&D cooperation enhances social welfare if pre-cooperative or at least post-
cooperative technological spillovers amongst the cooperating firms are suf-
ficiently high, given that Cournot or Bertrand competition prevails in the
product market. It is typically assumed that firms behave according to the
subgame perfect Nash (SPN) equilibrium in the product market, irrespective
of whether they cooperate in the R&D stage.
An intuitively appealing and empirically relevant question is whether co-
operation in R&D may translate into tacit collusion in the product market.
If such a relation exists, it is unclear, even for sufficiently high spillovers,
whether R&D cooperation is preferred on social welfare grounds. Moreover,
econometric estimations of the R&D models based on field data would give
seriously biased results.
Martin (1995), van Wegberg (1995), Cabral (2000) and Lambertini et al.
(2002) provide a theoretical framework to investigate whether R&D cooper-
ation facilitates cooperation in the product market. A general finding is that
R&D cooperation makes it more likely for tacit collusion to be sustained in
the product market. Vonortas (2000) provides empirical support by studying
the relationships between firms in research joint ventures that are formed un-
der the National Cooperative Research Act in the US. The author suggests
that the scope for collusive play in the product market is enlarged by the
combination of multi-R&D-proj ct and multimarket contact.
In this paper we investiga e whether cooperation in cost-reducing R&D
facilitates product market collusion in an experiment. A laboratory exper-
iment allows a ceteris paribus investigation of the relation between R&D
cooperation and product market collusion. It avoids endogeneity and mea-
surement problems that most likely arise in econometric analyses based on
field data.
In the experiment subjects repeatedly play a game inspired by the static
two-stage models of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al.
(1992). Taking into account the remark of Holt (1995) that the Cournot
model is more mechanical because it simulates price determination mechanics
(see also Tirole 1995, pages 223–224), Bertrand competition is implemented
2See the National Cooperative Research and Production Act in the US and Exemption
81(3) of the EC Treaty.
2
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in the product market.
Treatments where subjects have the possibility to make binding R&D
agreements are compared with baseline treatments without this possibility.
No binding commitments are allowed in the product market. Given the
importance of the level of technological spillovers in the theoretical and em-
pirical R&D literature (empirical studies are, e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers
2002, Kaiser 2002, Herna´n et al. 2003, Belderbos et al. 2004), the contract
and baseline treatments are run for a scenario without spillovers and for a
scenario with perfect spillovers.
The experimental evidence supports the hypothesis that R&D coopera-
tion facilitates price collusion: the degree of price collusion is significantly
higher in rounds where R&D agreements are made than in rounds without
R&D agreements and than in the baseline treatments.
Related laboratory research shows that collusion in the product market is
also facilitated by the possibility of announcing or signaling prices (Holt and
Davis 1990, Cason 1995, Harstad et al. 1998) and, under certain conditions,
by the ability to share information on demand or cost conditions (Cason
1994, Cason and Mason 1999). Moreover, collusion is more likely in repeated
games (Davis and Holt 1993, Keser 2000) and when the number of sellers
is low (Holt 1995, Huck et al. 2004). Whether engaging in binding R&D
contracts facilitates price collusion has not been examined in an experiment
before.
Examples of other related laboratory R&D experiments are Isaac and
Reynolds (1992) and Jullien and Ruffieux (2001). Both are dynamic experi-
ments and focus on the evolution of market prices in a setting where stochas-
tic non-cooperative R&D decisions can be made. Neither of the experiments
allows participants to commit to binding R&D contracts. In Suetens (2005a)
participants can commit to R&D contracts, but do not make product market
decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, an
outline of the theoretical model is given. Section 3 provides the experimental
design and procedure that has been followed. The experimental results are in
section 4. Data from an additional random-matching treatment are discussed
in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical predictions
The model that serves as a benchmark for the experiment is a modified ver-
sion of the AJ and KMZ models (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, Kamien
et al. 1992). Two firms compete over prices and sell differentiated products.
3
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The firms face the following linear demand curve in period t, with i, j = 1, 2
and i 6= j3:
qit(pit, pit) =
a
b+ c
−
bpit − cpjt
b2 − c2
. (1)
Each firm decides on R&D investment in period 1. It is assumed that invest-
ing in R&D reduces unit production costs and gives rise to a cost in period
1 and in all subsequent periods. After the R&D decision, firms make a fixed
number (m) of subsequent price decisions4.
This modification to the original KMZ and AJ models is motivated by rea-
sons of experimental design. In this way, subjects can assign changes in their
profits to changes in price decisions in a straightforward way and can learn
to make price decisions, given their R&D decisions. Besides, the assumption
that R&D decisions have a longer-term character than price decisions seems
plausible.
It is further assumed that technological spillovers may arise that reduce
the unit cost of the competitor. Replacing quantities by the direct demand
curves and assuming that R&D has decreasing returns yields the following
profit function of firm i in period t:
piit = (
a
b+ c
−
bpit − cpjt
b2 − c2
)(pit − [α− (xi1 + βxj1)])− δ
x2i1
2
, (2)
where pit is the price of products sold by firm i in period t and xi1 the R&D
investment of firm i in period 1. β represents the spillover parameter that
lies between 0 and 1, α stands for unit production cost if neither firm invests
in R&D, and the last term is the R&D cost function.
As suggested by Amir (2000), a steeper R&D cost function is used in
order to obtain decreasing returns to effective R&D (that is, xi1 + βxj1). In
particular, δ = γ(1+β) in the R&D cost function, where γ is the original AJ
cost parameter. By using this alternative cost function, equilibrium R&D
predictions are equivalent with KMZ, but the decision variables in the R&D
stage are unit cost reductions as in AJ5.
The game is solved by backward induction. Since firms are not allowed
to make binding agreements in the product market, the solution concept of
each price-setting stage of the game is the SPN equilibrium. Thus, the profit
of firm i is maximized with respect to its price in each period t starting with
the final period m. This yields the following equilibrium solution for the
3The inverse demand curve is pit(qit, qjt) = a− bqit − cqjt.
4In the experiment m = 5.
5Amir shows this for the case of quantity competition with homogeneous products, but
the same goes for the modified game with price competition and differentiated products.
4
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price of firm i in period t, in terms of the R&D decisions made by both firms
in the first period:
pSPNit =
(2b+ c)[a(b− c) + αb]− b[(2b+ βc)xi1 + (2bβ + c)xj1]
4b2 − c2
. (3)
If firms cannot make binding agreements with respect to their R&D in-
vestment in the R&D stage, this stage is also played non-cooperatively. The
solution concept is again the SPN equilibrium. Substituting equilibrium
prices (eq. 3) into the profit function (eq. 2) and maximizing the profit func-
tion in the R&D stage yields the following symmetric R&D equilibrium in
period 1, where superscripts in capitals (subscripts in lower-case letters) refer
to competition in prices (R&D)6:
xSPNspn =
2b(a− α)(2b2 − bβc− c2)
(1 + β)[γ(b+ c)(2b+ c)(2b− c)2 − 2b(2b2 − bβc− c2)]
. (4)
If firms are allowed to make binding R&D agreements and can reliably
commit to a cooperative R&D level, joint profit is maximized with respect to
R&D. This yields the following (symmetric) cooperative outcome for i = 1, 2
in period 17:
xSPNjpm =
2b(a− α)(b− c)
γ(b+ c)(2b− c)2 − 2b(1 + β)(b− c)
. (5)
The cooperative R&D level is larger (smaller) than the SPN R&D level
if actions in the R&D stage are strategic complements (substitutes), i.e. if
β>(<)
bc
2b2 − c2
. Profits that correspond to R&D cooperation are higher than
profits under R&D competition if β 6=
bc
2b2 − c2
.
Finally, consider the benchmark case of price collusion. If firms collude
in prices in period t, the following price can be derived for firm i in terms of
own R&D and R&D of the other firm:
pJPMit =
a+ α− (xi1 + βxj1)
2
. (6)
Given the R&D decisions, the collusive price is higher than the SPN price
for all parameter values. If firms expect to collude in the m price-setting
6It is assumed that the second-order conditions and the stability conditions suggested
by Henriques (1990) are met.
7It is again assumed that the second-order condition is met. We also assume that the
cooperative R&D level is unique and symmetric (see Salant and Shaffer 1998).
5
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xspn xjpm pspn pjpm pispn pijpm Wspn Wjpm
SPN behavior in price-setting stage
β = 0 17.4 9.5 85.3 91.2 862.6 891.0 4779.6 4614.0
β = 1 4.8 10.0 91.2 83.3 913.8 936.8 4657.5 5003.6
Collusion in price-setting stage
β = 0 28.0 13.0 133.5 141.0 1112.1 1214.2 3713.6 3723.4
β = 1 6.5 13.9 141.0 133.6 1254.6 1300.7 3804.2 4087.6
Table 1: Theoretical benchmarks
stages, profits in the R&D stage are formulated in terms of the collusive
prices. This yields other predictions for the SPN and cooperative R&D levels
in period 1. These are respectively:
xJPMspn =
(a− α)[2b− c(1 + β)]
(1 + β)[4γ(b− c)(b+ c)− 2b+ c(1 + β)]
and (7)
xJPMjpm =
(a− α)
2γ(b+ c)− (1 + β)
. (8)
The theoretical benchmarks that correspond to the parameters chosen in
the experiment are given in table 18. With respect to the choice of parameter
values, we have tried to ensure that the sensitivity of profit to an increase in
R&D is sufficiently high, but it is inherent to the model that the sensitivity
of profit to a price change is higher than to a change in R&D. Parameter
values used in the experiment are a = 245, α = 50, b = 5, c = 3.35 and
γ = 0.96. Turning from individual to joint profit maximizing R&D yields a
profit increase of 3 to 9%, depending on price-setting behavior and the level
of spillovers, while turning from the individual to the joint profit maximizing
price yields a profit increase of 29 to 39%, depending on R&D decisions and
β.
In the scenario with β = 0, R&D cooperation yields a reduction in welfare,
given that firms compete in prices in the second stage. On the contrary, with
β = 1, welfare is increased under R&D cooperation. If firms collude in prices,
welfare is always lower compared to when they compete.
Theory predicts prices to be symmetric and at the SPN level in each
period t, irrespective of whether binding agreements can be made in the
R&D stage. It also predicts that R&D is at the SPN level if no binding R&D
agreements can be made and at the cooperative level if R&D agreements
can be and are made. In the experiment the modified game is repeated
8The parameters satisfy stability conditions (Henriques) and the conditions for R&D
solutions to be symmetric (Salant and Shaffer).
6
Page 7 of 24 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
BASE CON
β = 0 30 (15) 32 (16)
β = 1 22 (11) 30 (15)
Table 2: Treatments and number of subjects (duopolies)
7 times so as to represent repeated interaction between firms in oligopoly
markets. Thus, each subject makes 7 R&D decisions and 35 price decisions
in total (excluding the trial rounds). It is clear from following the backward
induction rule that finitely repeating the game does not change the theoretical
predictions.
3 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment was run in CentERlab at Tilburg University and consisted of
six computerized sessions with a total number of 114 recruited students. The
software z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (1999) was used. Students were
undergraduates in economics, law or social sciences and had participated
before in other types of experiments. Each session lasted for two hours and
earnings were between 11.5 and 30.5 EUR. Before the experiment started,
instructions (see appendix A9) were handed out and the students had the
opportunity to ask questions. During the trial rounds, instructions were
clarified aloud.
The experiment consisted of four treatments: a baseline treatment with-
out contract possibilities (BASE) and a treatment with contract possibilities
(CON), both for a scenario without technological spillovers (β = 0) and with
full spillovers (β = 1). The number of participants and duopolies in each
treatment is given in table 2.
The instructions made clear that the subjects represented a seller-pro-
ducer of an unspecified product in a market with two sellers of a similar, but
not identical product, and that demand of consumers was simulated by the
computer. The duopolies were fixed during the experiment and subjects had
no knowledge of the identity of their counterpart. Subjects were told that (the
simulated) consumers buy more (less) of their own product and less (more)
of the product of their counterpart, the lower (higher) the prices of their own
product. In all treatments the demand curve was qi(pi, pj) ≈ 29.34−0.36pi+
0.24pj based on an inverse demand curve of pi(qi, qj) = 245 − 5qi − 3.35qj.
Subjects knew that their counterpart was subject to the same conditions.
9All appendices are available on the JEBO website.
7
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The subjects were asked to make investment (R&D) and price decisions
during 35 rounds, preceded by five practice rounds aimed at getting ac-
quainted with the computer program. The decisions made in the practice
rounds were ignored when calculating final remunerations. Investment was
constrained to be between 0.0 and 50.0 and the price between 0.0 and 245.0.
Investment decisions were made every five rounds and remained at the same
level during five subsequent rounds. Price decisions were made in all 35
rounds.
It was also explained to the subjects that investment reduced unit pro-
duction costs by an equal amount (and unit production costs of the other
producer in case of β = 1). However, investing also incurred a cost of half
of the square of the amount (the square of the amount in case of β = 1)10.
A profit calculator was always available where own profit and profit of the
other duopolist could be automatically calculated if fictive values of invest-
ment and price decisions were filled in. Decisions made in the previous round
were shown on the screen.
In the investment stage of the contract treatments, an additional frame
was shown on the screen that enabled subjects to send a contract proposal
to their counterpart. In order to replicate the theoretical scenario of R&D
cooperation as closely as possible and not to complicate further the possible
interactions, contracts were imposed to be symmetric and binding. It was
stressed that the sender of a proposal was committed to his proposal once
the counterpart accepted it, even if other proposals were made by either of
them. All contract proposals were numbered, and if a contract was accepted,
the number of the accepted contract was shown on the screen. The amount
of contract proposals per round was not limited as long as no contract was
accepted in that round and as long as one of the two players had not entered
the R&D decision in that round. The implemented contracting device has
been shown to be effective in eliciting R&D cooperation in an experiment
without a pricing stage in cases with and without full technological spillovers
(see Suetens 2005a).
When all investment decisions were entered, subjects were informed about
their own and their counterpart’s decision and the following stage started.
When all price decisions were entered, they were informed about their own
and their counterpart’s price decisions and the level of profit in that round.
Profit in experimental units was generated following equation (2). Remuner-
ations in EUR were calculated by dividing the sum of profits in experimental
units over the 35 rounds by 1500, and subjects were informed about this
10The parameter value of γ has been set to 0.96, such that δ ≈ 1 with β = 0 and δ ≈ 2
with β = 1.
8
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price R&D
BASE CON BASE CON
β = 0 94.3 (24.0) 103.2 (24.2) 19.9 (5.3) 20.1 (7.6)
β = 1 93.5 (19.9) 93.5 (24.2) 10.6 (6.4) 17.4 (7.3)
Table 3: Average prices and R&D decisions (standard deviations)
exchange rate.
4 Experimental results
Table 3 provides a brief summary of average prices and R&D decisions and
their standard deviations in the four treatments. With β = 0 the average
price in CON is higher than in BASE, and average R&D decisions are not
very different between BASE and CON. With β = 1 the average price is the
same in BASE and CON, and the average R&D decision in CON is higher
than in BASE.
A feature of the multistage game is that benchmark prices are defined
in terms of R&D decisions (see equations 3 and 6). This implies that if ex-
perimental R&D decisions change every five rounds, benchmark prices also
change. Likewise, benchmark R&D decisions also depend on subjects’ expec-
tations on prices. In what follows in this section, we take these considerations
into account. In section 4.1 we discuss the degree of price collusion, and in
section 4.2 the R&D decisions11. In all reported statistics, each duopoly is
taken as an independent observation.
4.1 Degree of price collusion
The main question we are interested in is whether R&D cooperation facili-
tates price collusion. In other words, we want to examine whether prices in
CON deviate more from the SPN price level toward the collusive price than
in BASE. We measure the degree of price collusion of each duopoly in round
t as follows:
Pt =
p¯t − p¯
SPN
t
p¯JPMt − p¯
SPN
t
, (9)
where for each duopoly, p¯t is the average experimental price in round t and
p¯Kt with K = SPN, JPM is calculated on the basis of the experimental R&D
11The individual data are available from the author on request or on
www.ua.ac.be/sigrid.suetens.
9
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decisions according to equations 3 and 6. In this way, price benchmarks are
defined in terms of the actually observed R&D decisions. If Pt = 0(1) the
average price of the duopoly in round t is at the SPN (JPM) level, given the
R&D decisions made in that round. If 0 < Pt < 1 the average price of the
duopoly in round t is between the SPN and the JPM level, given the R&D
decisions made in that round.
The evolution of the average degree of price collusion in BASE and CON
is given in figure 1(a)12. The figure shows that the degree of price collusion
is on average higher in CON than in BASE for both spillover scenarios.
Figure 1(b) splits up the average degree of price collusion within CON into an
average based on rounds where R&D contracts were actually made (CON1)
and an average based on rounds without R&D contracts (CON0)13. More
price collusion is observed in rounds with R&D contracts than in rounds
without contracts, for both β = 0 and β = 1.
Another observation from figure 1 is that the average degree of price col-
lusion gradually increases during the experiment and falls in the last round
of the experiment due to a well-known end effect. This fall is most pro-
nounced in CON1 and suggests that at least part of the price collusion is
strategic. The figure also has a cyclical pattern. In the first round of each
five-rounds cycle, there is a jump in price collusion that typically tends to
be offset towards the end of the cycle. These observations correspond closely
to behavior in earlier experiments on finitely repeated duopoly supergames
(see, e.g., Selten and Stoecker 1986).
Means and standard deviations of the degree of price collusion are re-
ported in table 414. The different columns in the table refer to different sub-
sets of rounds. P¯1−35 is based on all observations in the experiment. P¯26−35
is based on the last ten rounds, so as to focus on decisions when subjects
have gathered experience in the game. P¯1st and P¯5th are based on the first,
respectively last rounds of each set of five subsequent rounds with a constant
R&D decision.
Table 4 shows that the average degree of price collusion is similar in
treatments with β = 0 and β = 115. A relatively high level of price collusion is
12In 14 out of 1995 (57*35) cases, prices were chosen that yielded a negative production
quantity. These observations were left out of all descriptives tables and data analyses.
This did not affect the conclusions.
13The calculation of averages in rounds with R&D contracts (CON1) is based on all
rounds of each set of five subsequent rounds where an R&D contract has been committed
to, and thus not only on the first.
14Reported standard deviations only give an indication of cross-sectional heterogeneity
and not of heterogeneity in time.
15Mann-Whitney-U tests confirm that there are no significant differences in degree of
price collusion between β = 0 and β = 1 for the BASE and CON.
10
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(a) baseline and contract treatments
(b) within contract treatments
Figure 1: Evolution of average degree of price collusion
observed in the contract treatments when R&D contracts were made (CON1).
Without contracts (CON0), prices are close to the Nash level. In BASE,
prices are slightly above the Nash level.
11
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Treatment P¯1−35 P¯26−35 P¯1st P¯5th
β = 0
BASE 0.21 (0.33) 0.28 (0.41) 0.23 (0.32) 0.17 (0.32)
CON0 0.12 (0.19) 0.06 (0.14) 0.21 (0.25) 0.08 (0.24)
CON1 0.49 (0.33) 0.56 (0.37) 0.61 (0.32) 0.36 (0.39)
β = 1
BASE 0.20 (0.30) 0.20 (0.31) 0.26 (0.29) 0.16 (0.30)
CON0 -0.03 (0.13) -0.03 (0.18) 0.02 (0.20) -0.03 (0.12)
CON1 0.41 (0.29) 0.43 (0.31) 0.51 (0.30) 0.31 (0.32)
Table 4: Average degrees of price collusion
rounds 1-35 26-35 1st 5th
between BASE and CON0
2-tailed sig. 0.100a 0.140a 0.245a 0.041a
N 49 40 49 49
between BASE and CON1
2-tailed sig. 0.004b 0.012b 0.001b 0.045b
N 54 52 54 54
aH1 : P¯BASE
>
6= P¯CON.;
bH1 : P¯CON.
>
6= P¯BASE
Table 5: Contract treatment effects on degree of price collusion
Table 5 contains p-values of two-tailed Mann-Whitney-U tests of differ-
ences between BASE and CON0 and between BASE and CON1. The under-
lying numbers of independent observations are also reported16. Data from
β = 0 and β = 1 are pooled because the degree of price collusion does not
significantly differ.
The tests provide strong evidence that the degree of price collusion in
CON1 is higher than in BASE. This is also the case in the last ten rounds,
where subjects had gained experience17. Successful R&D cooperation thus
facilitates price collusion.
Table 5 further shows that overall there is no significant difference in the
degree of price collusion between BASE and CON0. This also goes for the
16The total number of duopolies that underlie the test results are smaller than the total
number of participating duopolies (see table 2) because some duopolies never committed
to an R&D contract and some always did so.
17Due to a smaller number of observations, the evidence weakens somewhat when con-
sidering β = 0 and β = 1 separately, but the same picture emerges. Only in the final
rounds of five-rounds cycles are one-tailed tests combined with a p-value of 10% needed
to draw the same conclusion.
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rounds 1-35 26-35 1st 5th
2-tailed sig. 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
N 20 9 20 20
H1 : P¯CON1
>
6= P¯CON0
Table 6: Within contract treatment effects on degree of price collusion
final ten rounds and the first rounds of the five-rounds cycles. In the fifth
rounds of the five-rounds cycles, however, the degree of price collusion is
significantly lower in CON0 than in BASE. This may indicate that subjects
punish one another for not having reached a satisfactory R&D agreement by
lowering their prices below a level that would normally have been reached
without contract possibilities. This behavior is in line with the experimental
findings discussed in Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) and coincides with the
within-treatment test results that are discussed below.
Table 6 contains Wilcoxon signed-ranks test statistics for comparisons
within the contract treatment (i.e. between CON0 and CON1). The tests are
based on duopolies that switched between committing and not committing to
an R&D contract in the related subset of rounds. Decisions of duopolies that
either never or always signed a contract in that subset of rounds necessarily
drop out of the within-analysis. This explains the reduction in the number
of observations in the table (N) compared to the between-analyses.
As table 6 shows, the difference in degree of price collusion between rounds
with and without R&D contracts is highly significant18.
Summarizing, on the basis of between- and within-tests we find strong
statistical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that successful R&D coopera-
tion facilitates price collusion. The degree of price collusion not only increases
in the rounds that directly follow the actual R&D contracting decision, but
also remains at the higher level until the end of each five-rounds cycle. This
holds until the end of the experiment, suggesting that the increase in degree
of price collusion elicited by successful R&D contracting is sustainable.
4.2 R&D decisions
From the previous section we know that the degree of price collusion mostly
lies somewhere between 0 and 1. This implies that prices are predominantly
18When looking at β = 0 and β = 1 separately, the differences remain significant at a
2% level for all subsets of rounds provided that there are enough data that underlie the
tests.
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Figure 2: R&D decisions and benchmarks as a function of average degree of
price collusion
not at the SPN or cooperative level. As a consequence, R&D decisions can-
not simply be compared to the theoretical benchmarks given in table 1 that
are based on the assumption of individual or joint profit maximizing behavior
in the price-setting stages. Defining theoretical SPN and JPM R&D deci-
sions in terms of the degree of price collusion would allow us to compare the
experimental R&D decisions with the R&D benchmarks corresponding to
the price-setting behavior observed in the experiment. This can be done by
using the coefficient of cooperation approach in the price-setting stage (see
appendix B).
The coefficient of cooperation approach defines firm i’s profit maximiza-
tion problem in the price-setting stage in period t as maxpit piit+φitpijt. When
symmetry is assumed such that φt = φit = φjt in period t, the SPN and JPM
R&D benchmarks can be defined in terms of φt. Under symmetry, since a
positive relation exists between the degree of price collusion, Pt, and φt (see
also appendix B), the SPN and JPM R&D benchmarks can be expressed in
terms of the degree of price collusion. In figure 2 the dashed and bold lines
represent the SPN and JPM R&D benchmarks, respectively.
Figure 2 also contains ellipses, the centers of which represent average
R&D decisions as a function of the average degree of price collusion for
BASE, CON0 and CON1. The horizontal diagonals of the ellipses represent
confidence intervals of the average degree of price collusion and the vertical
diagonals represent confidence intervals of average R&D decisions. Confi-
dence intervals are calculated as the mean ± 2 standard errors.
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The location of R&D decisions for β = 0 in figure 2 suggests that R&D
decisions in BASE and CON0 are close to the SPN prediction. In CON1
average R&D is below the line representing the SPN R&D level, which is in
the ‘right’ direction, given that cooperative R&D is smaller than SPN R&D.
With β = 1, the R&D ellipses representing BASE and CON0 are located
close to the curve representing R&D cooperation. Contracted R&D decisions
(CON1) overshoot the cooperative level. Thus, with β = 1 R&D decisions
differ in the ‘right’ way between CON1 and BASE or CON0, although they
are generally ‘too high’. It could be the case that, with β = 1, the R&D
contracts have been used to signal a willingness to collude in prices. In-
deed, since then R&D and price decisions both have positive externalities,
joint profit maximization yields higher R&D and price decisions compared to
their respective SPN equilibria. This form of signaling may have been more
difficult and costly with β = 0 because then R&D decisions have negative ex-
ternalities. In this case joint profit maximizing R&D is lower than the SPN
R&D level. The finding that significantly more R&D contracts have been
proposed and chosen with β = 1 than with β = 0 (Mann-Whitney-U tests
give p-values of 0.017 and 0.049, respectively) is in line with this suggestion19.
5 A random-matching treatment
In order to examine possible interaction between the finding that R&D con-
tracts facilitate price collusion and the matching scheme, we ran an additional
random-matching treatment with R&D contract possibilities for the case of
β = 1 (henceforth referred to as RANCON, β = 1). In RANCON, β = 1 the
counterpart of participants changed every five rounds and participants were
informed about this in the instructions. For the rest, the same procedure as
in the fixed-matching treatments has been followed.
RANCON, β = 1 covered two sessions with 18 and 12 participants in
each, respectively, giving 30 participants (15 duopolies) in total. The ran-
dom matching was executed within groups of six participants, such that the
first and the second session respectively produced 3 and 2 independent ob-
servations (5 in total). In what follows in this section, we present a short
description of behavior in this treatment taking into account the same data
considerations as in section 4.1.
Following expectations, the average degree of price collusion with random
matching is lower than the one with fixed matching (see also Holt 1985,
Huck et al. 2001). This is clearly shown in figure 3(a), which depicts the
19In chapter 10 of Suetens (2005b) experimental evidence is provided that tends to
confirm the suggestion.
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(a) CON and RANCON, β = 1 (b) within RANCON, β = 1
Figure 3: Evolution of average degree of price collusion in RANCON, β = 1
evolution of the average degree of price collusion in RANCON, β = 1 and
CON, β = 120. A Mann-Whitney-U test based on independent observations
provides evidence that, overall, the degree of price collusion is significantly
lower with random matching than with fixed matching at the 10% level, with
a two-tailed p-value of 0.066.
Figure 3(b) further splits up RANCON, β = 1 in RANCON0 and RAN-
CON1, respectively based on rounds without and with R&D contracts. Clearly,
with random matching, the average degree of price collusion is higher when
contracts are actually committed to than when not committed to21. It is
thus unlikely that there is an interaction between the finding that R&D co-
operation facilitates price collusions and the matching design.
With respect to the experimental R&D decisions in RANCON, β = 1,
we find very similar patterns to CON, β = 1. Here also, R&D decisions
are overall ‘too high’ compared to the theoretical benchmarks and there is
considerable overshooting of contracted R&D (see appendix C).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we examined whether R&D cooperation facilitates price collu-
sion in experimental duopoly markets. Subjects in the experiment were asked
20We use CON, β = 1 as a basis for comparison because RANCON, β = 1 has contract
possibilities and β = 1. See appendix C for the average degree of price collusion and
standard deviations in RANCON, β = 1.
21For all subsets of rounds the Wilcoxon-signed ranks test gives two-tailed p-values of
0.063, which is the best possible p-value for 5 independent observations.
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to make R&D and price decisions repeatedly. For two scenarios of techno-
logical spillovers (i.e. no spillovers (β = 0) and complete spillovers (β = 1)),
a treatment without binding R&D contracts and a treatment with binding
contracts were run. An additional random-matching treatment with R&D
contracts has been run for β = 1 in order to control for possible interaction
effects between the matching design and the effectiveness of R&D contracts
in facilitating price collusion.
We find strong support for the idea that binding R&D cooperation fa-
cilitates price collusion. First, in the contract treatments significantly more
price collusion is observed when R&D agreements are reached than in the
baseline treatments. Second, within the contract treatments there is signif-
icantly more price collusion when R&D agreements are reached than when
they are not.
This finding implies that econometric estimations of theoretical R&D
models based on field data that assume non-cooperative prices despite R&D
cooperation would give seriously biased results. Moreover, for public author-
ities who have recently been lenient toward the formation of research joint
ventures, the findings in the lab may provide a warning. Since the exper-
imental setting is fully anonymous and excludes any possibility of personal
contact or price signaling, the stimulating effect of successful R&D agree-
ments on price collusion may be viewed as a minimum effect. It is likely that
in the field there exist many more opportunities for representatives of firms
engaged in R&D cooperation to interact. However, cooperative R&D agree-
ments are often subsidized by governments, and information on the type of
cooperation and the identity of participating firms is thus relatively easily
available, providing an opportunity for public authorities to investigate the
possibility of price collusion and fine colluding firms when necessary.
Appendix A Translated instructions
Note that the instructions are translated from the originals in Dutch and
that additional instructions for the treatments with complete technological
spillovers and the treatments with contract possibilities are in brackets and
in bold.
You are participating in an economic experiment on decision-making of pro-
ducers. During this session you will be asked to make a number of decisions.
The amount of your earnings depends on your decisions and decisions of an-
other participant. The instructions are simple. If you carefully follow them
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and make good decisions, the probability of earning more money is larger.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other par-
ticipants.
In the experiment, the economy is divided into a number of industries.
In each of these industries two sellers-producers are active who sell and pro-
duce similar products. Each of you represents a seller-producer in a specific
industry. The other producer in your industry (henceforth your counterpart)
is in the same situation with the same conditions as you. Each producer,
including you, has to take an investment decision first and then a price de-
cision. The customers who eventually buy your products are simulated by
the computer. The rule is: the higher the price of a certain variation of a
product compared to another variation, the less products are bought of the
first variation and the more of the other variation.
What you will earn, depends on your and your counterpart’s investment
and price decisions. Under the title ‘Winstsimulatie’ [‘Profit simulation’] you
always have the possibility to calculate your and your counterpart’s profit. If
you fill in hypothetical values of your own and your counterpart’s investment,
and of your own and your counterpart’s prices, you can calculate your and
your counterpart’s hypothetical profit by clicking the button ‘Bereken’ [‘Cal-
culate’]. By using this profit simulator you cannot input you final investment
or price decision, it only serves as an aid with making your decisions.
Your investment decreases your [ and your counterpart’s ] unit produc-
tion cost (with the amount of the investment) on the one hand and presents
a cost equal to half of the square [ the square ] of the amount of investment.
Your final investment decision should be filled in under the title ‘Finale in-
vesteringsbeslissing ingeven’ [‘Enter final investment decision’]. Each time
you made an investment decision, it will remain constant for 5 subsequent
periods. You have 200 seconds to take each investment decision. The invest-
ment should be between 0,0 and 50,0.
[ In the investment stages you have the possibility to engage in a
contract with your counterpart under the title called ‘Contracten’
[‘Contracts’]. You can send her/him a proposal to both invest a
certain amount (fill in the proposal in the appropriate space and
send it by clicking on ‘Zend contractvoorstel’ [‘Send contract pro-
posal’]) and he/she can also send proposals. From the moment
you sent a contract proposal, you are bound to invest what you
proposed, if your counterpart has agreed with your proposal. Your
own and your counterpart’s proposals are shown on the screen.
You can accept a proposal of your counterpart by selecting it and
clicking on the button called ‘Dit contract aanvaarden’ [‘Accept
this contract’]. If a contract is committed to, you (and your coun-
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terpart) are obliged to invest the contracted amount. You can find
the number of the chosen contract on your screen. ]
When all investment decisions are made, a second screen shows up, where
you again have the possibility to calculate your and your counterpart’s profit
on the basis of hypothetical decisions [‘Winstsimulatie’]. Information on
your and your counterpart’s investment decision in that period is given on
your screen. In this second stage, you have to decide on the selling price of
your products. Under ‘Winstsimulatie’ you can, e.g., fill in the investment
decisions in that period, and hypothetical prices, so as to calculate the cor-
responding profit. Your final price decision should be given in under the title
‘Finale prijsbeslissing ingeven’ [‘Enter final price decision’]. You have 100
seconds take each price decision. The price should be between 0,0 and 245,0.
When all price decisions are made, a screen shows up with information on
the decisions made in that period by you and your counterpart. Information
on the profit earned in that period is also shown. You can continue by clicking
on ‘Ga door naar de volgende periode’ [‘Continue to the following period’].
As already mentioned, your investment decision remains constant during
5 subsequent periods. In the periods without investment decisions, only price
decisions are to be taken. Information of the previous or the same period is
always shown on the screen.
The experiment contains 40 periods which implies that eventually 8 in-
vestment and 40 price decisions will have been taken. The first 5 periods are
practice periods and do not influence your final earnings. Your final earnings
in Euro are calculated by dividing the total profit you made in the experiment
(from period 6 to 40) by 1500. The experiment will take about 2 hours.
Appendix B The coefficient of cooperation ap-
proach
Consider the following profit maximization problem, where a firm maximizes
its own profit and a part φit of the other firm’s profit in period t with i =
1, 2; j = 1, 2; i 6= j:
max
pit
piit + φitpijt.
This approach is sometimes referred to as the coefficient of cooperation ap-
proach (see, e.g., Martin 2001). Solving this problem yields a price for i
expressed in terms of xi1, xj1, φit and φit:
pit = pit(xi1, xj1, φit, φjt). (10)
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φit is clearly a measure for the cooperative preference of firm i in period
t. When φit = 0, pit is equal to equation 3, which is the SPN price level that
maximizes individual profit, and when φit = 1, pit is equal to equation 6,
which is the collusive price level that maximizes joint profit. For 0 < φit < 1
it is clear that pit lies between both benchmarks. The degree of price collusion
representative for the duopoly can thus be measured by φt =
∑
i=1,2 φit
2
for
i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
We calculate the degree of price collusion of a duopoly in period t as
follows:
Pt =
p¯t − p¯
SPN
t
p¯JPMt − p¯
SPN
t
, (11)
where p¯t =
∑
i=1,2 pit
2
and p¯Kt =
∑
i=1,2 p
K
it
2
with K representing SPN or JPM.
As Pt = 0(1) the average price of the duopoly in period t is at the SPN
(JPM) level.
When R&D decisions and collusion preferences are symmetric such that
xi1 = xj1 and φt = φit = φjt for i = 1, 2; j = 1, 2; i 6= j, we get the following
relation between both measures of degree of price collusion in period t by
filling in (10) in (9) :
Pt =
2φt(b− c)
2b− c(φt + 1)
, (12)
where for any value of φt between 0 and 1, Pt is increasing and convex in φt.
Appendix C Average decisions in RANCON,
β = 1
P¯1−35 P¯26−35 P¯1st P¯5th
RANCON0 -0.03 (0.08) -0.02 (0.06) -0.04 (0.11) -0.09 (0.08)
RANCON1 0.20 (0.12) 0.25 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14) -0.01 (0.06)
x¯1−35 x¯26−35
RANCON0 6.8 (3.0) 3.7 (3.0)
RANCON1 20.0 (1.3) 18.8 (2.4)
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